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1Trust and Discrimination in a Segmented Society:
An Experimental Approach
Abstract: An experimental approach is used to study ethnic discrimination within the
Israeli Jewish society. Our experiment indicates that the segmented structure of Israeli
society manifests itself in a consistent pattern of mistrust. In a tmst game that we studied,
money transferred to players of Eastem ethnic origin (Sephazdic Jew) was significantly
less than that transferred to players of Western origin (Ashkenazic Jew). What is
surprising is that this ethnic discrimination was entirely a male phenomenon. Women, in
our experiment, transferred a similaz amount of money to their partners whether of
Eastem or Westem background; at the same time, the distribution oftransfers to Eastern
women was similaz to that to Westem women. Thus, the ethnic discrimination identified
in our experiment is only toward male players and by male players. Moreover, this
systematic mistrust against men of Eastem origin is common not just among Western
men but also among Eastem men themselves. Examination of whether trust is
gender-dependent showed that Westem women are trusted less than Westem men while
Eastem women aze tmsted more than Eastern men. The possibility of statistical
discrimination was also examined, but no evidence for such an effect was found.
2Trust and Discrimination in a Segmented Society:
An Experimental Approach
1. Introductiou
Economic interactions are not govemed solely by contractual agreements. Trust
plays an important mle in facilitating efficient activities. As Arrow (1972) pointed out,
"virtually every cornmercial transaction has within itself an element of trust."2 In a
multi-country comparison, Knack and Keefer (1997) showed, that trust was associated
with stronger economic performance.' This finding is not surprising if we think of the
role of trust in promoting business, partnerships between firms, joint research ventures
etc. Although tnist may be important in understanding the patterns of development of
different countries, it may also be useful in understanding the relationship between social
segmentation and economic performance within societies. That is, trust within each group
and between groups may explain the overall perfotmance of a society, but it also may
affect the relative economic achievement of each group.
One common criticism of using social variables like trust and norms of
cooperation to explain economic phenomenon is the fact that they are hard to measure.
Knack and Keefer (1997) employed survey indicators to measure trust in a society with
the following question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Dealing with trust within
different segments ofa given society, however, may be more complex than that question
' See also Gambetta (1988), Putman (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) for a study of the role of trust in the
performance ofsocieties and institutions.
3implies, since trust may vary across groups and between groups and, therefore, one
cannot speak about "people" in general.
In this paper, we use the experimental approach in order to observe directly the
trust (or mistrust) among individuals who belong to different social segments. The level
of trust between groups may be viewed as a measurement of social segmentation within a
society-a variable that is also difficult to measure.'
A study conducted by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) focused on trust
among players in an experimental game. There are two players, A and B. Player A is
given a fixed amount ofmoney and asked to decide whether to transfer part of it to Player
B. The amount transferred is tripled, and Player B may choose to repay to Player A. The
subgame perfect equilibrium ofthis game is clearly the no transfer of money from A to B
and no repayment (from B to A). This is not the outcome of the experiment, however.
Berg et al.'s expetiment confirmed that Player A typically sent a positive amount of
money to Player B, who often returned an even lazger amount. A similaz, less stylized
procedure was used by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedel (1993) and by Fehr, Gachter, and
Kirchsteiger (1997). A similar experimental study was conducted by Guth, Ockenfels,
and Wendel (1994).
In the foregoing game, there aze gains to be obtained through cooperation. The
efficient outcome, which maximizes the total pie, would require Player A to transfer all
his resources to Player B(as these resources would then be tripled). The subgame perfect
' See also Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) for a cross section multi-country study of
trust and cooperation.
' One may dis[inguish between cultural segmentation, in which each group has a different customs and
social segmentation that reflects the trust between individuals of different groups.
4equilibrium, on the other hand, implies no transfers and thus does not at all exploit the
gains from trade. The amount that Player A transfers to B serves, in such an experiment,
as an indication of trust or cooperation between the two players, since the amount of
money that Player A transfers to Player B is based on his(her) trust that Player B will
repay at least the same amount. Thus such an experimental setup may be useful in
studying trust in different societies and possible mistrust between groups in a given
society.
This paper employ the trust game to study social segmentation and ethnic
discrimination within the Israeli Jewish society.s When a society is fragmented, trust may
depend on group affilia[ion. It is possible that such a structure leads to a pattem of
systematic discrimination, in which members of one group do not trust players from other
groups or even their own group's members. The Israeli Jewish society is characterized by
an ethnic structtue that is based primarily on country of origin. The two major ethnic
groups aze Western Jews (immigrants from Europe and America and their Israeli-bom
offspring) and Eastern Jews (immigrants from Asia and Africa and their Israeli-born
offspring).6 There are persistent economic gaps between the two segments. Western
' Clearly an important and heated segmentation in Israeli society is [hat between Arabs and Jews, but we
leave this issue for future research. Ano[her important segmentation in the Israeli Jewish society is that
between secular and t)rthodox lews. This latter segmentation is reflected in Israel political life, in which
each group has its own political party or faction in the Israelipazliament (Knesset).
6 The temu Eastem and Westem ]ews are the politicallycorrect ways to denote the more familiar defmition
of Sephazdic and Ashkenazic Jews. It is interesting to observe, however, that the lazgest country oforigin
among the Westem lews is Poland and the former Soviet Union whíle the largest country of origin among
the Eastern Jews is Marocco. A short glimpse at the mapreveals that Mazocco is clearly west of Poland.
5immigrants achieve higher levels of education and earnings than do Eastern immigrants,
and these gaps continue to prevail among for second-generation immigrants.'
Our experiment indicates that the segmented structure ofthe Israeli society indeed
manifests itself in a consistent pattem of mistrust. Specifically, in the trust game that we
studied, the amount of money transferred to players of Eastem ethnic origin was
significantly lower than that transferred to players ofWestern origin. What is surprising is
that this pattem of ethnic discrimination was entirely a male phenomenon. Women, in our
experiment, transferred the same amount of money to partners, whether men or women,
or ofEastern or Westem background. We did not find any evidence of ethnic attachments
among women.s
Are women discriminated against? The answer to this question depends, again, on
ethnic affiliation. In our experiment, Western women received lower money transfers
than did Westem men. On the other hand, Eastern women received lazger transfers than
do Eastern men. What is surprising is that the distribution oftransfers to Eastetn women
was similar to that to Western women. Thus, the ethnic discrimination identified in our
experiment was manifested only with respect to male players and by male players. This
systematic discrimination against men of Eastem origin, moreover, was common notjust
among Western men but also among Eastem men who discriminated against Eastern
men. The distribution of transfers by male players, Eastem and Westem, to the different
' For an extensive discussion of the gaps in Israeli society, see, for example, Cohen and Haberfeld (1998),
Eisenstadt (1985), Mark (1994), Semyonov and Kraus (1983), Semyonov and Lerenthal (1991), and Shavit
(1984).
" The comparison of behavior according to gender has a long tradition in the social sciences. See, for
example, Bolton and Katok (199~), Andreoni and Vesterlund (1997), Eckel and Grossman (1997), and for
a recent survey of this literature, Eckel and Grossman (1998). The main fmding of this literature is that
6types ofpartners was similar. Therefore, in our experiment, we found no difference in the
behavior of the two ethnic groups, while there was a striking difference in the behavior of
the two genders.
Whenever certain individuals or groups are treated differently, one of the
immediate questions is whether such discrimination has a market-base explanation or it
just reflects the taste for discrimination (see Becker, 1957). For example, one can justify a
different health insurance premium for smokers, as smoking affects health. This type of
discrimination is denoted as statistical discrimination (see Arrow, 1973, 1998). That is, if
individuals of different ethnic affiliations respond difi~erently in the trust game, one can
azgue that the discrimination between them is rational. We therefore examined the
response of students who played the role of Player B. No evidence was found that a
male~Eastem player sent back an amount that differed from that ofa malelWestern player.
It is possible, however, that players' discrimination according to ethnic origin of their
partners is based on ethnic stereotypes that affect the players' assessment about the likely
respond of their game partner and that these stereotypes aze incorrect. On the other hand a
possible altemative explanation is that the unfavorable treatment of malelEastem players
is only motivated by the players' prejudice who consequently forego some of the profits
that can be made in the experiment. Thus the discrimination that we identified satisfy the
deftnition of discrimination given by Becker (1993), who azgued that "discrimination in
the mazketplace consists of voluntarily relinquishing profits, wages, or income in order to
cater to prejudice."
men are more selfish than women. In the economics literature, however, the fmdings are far less conclusive
and appear to depend strongly on the context ofthe study.
7The literature describes two methods for testing discrimination: regression
analysis and audits.' Most of the research deals with discrimination in consumption and
labor mazkets, as these variables are formally registered. The regression method is
indirect, whereas the audit method uses a matched-pair survey that allows researchers to
observe behavior directly (see, for example, Ayres and Sigelman, 1995).'o Our method,
while different from the two aforementioned techniques, is similaz in approach to the
audit method, as it tries to obtain a direct observation of behavior. This paper
concentrates on discrimination with respect to trust, a variable that is difficult to quantify
but yet very important in our daily life. How can we quantify the trust that a bank loan
officer has in difl'erent clients, or the trust that people put in their doctor, lawyer, or in any
other expert?
The subject ofdiscrimination is sensitive and controversial in any society, but this
does not imply that we should avoid studying and discussing it. We do, though,
emphasize that what we report in this paper is the outcome of an experiment that captures
one form of discrimination; the results cannot automatically be generalized to different
strategic situations. On the other hand trust may be instnunental in explaining earning
gaps between different groups in a society. Our finding is consistent with the observation
that the ethnic earnings gaps in Israel among women are indeed smaller than are among
men and that in recent years Western men have increased the eamings gap between them
and other groups (see Cohen and Haberfeld, 1998).
' See the special Symposium issue on Discrimination in Product, Credit and Labor Markets that appeared in
The Journal of Economic Perspecrive (1998) and the following papers in this symposium: Yinger ( 1998),
Ladd (1998), Dariry and Mason (1998), Arrow ( 1998), Heckman (1998) and Loury (1998).
82 Short bsckground of Eastern and Western ethnic ~roups in Israel
In 1948, when the state of Israel was established, there were 600,000 Jews in
Israel, most of them of Western origin. From then to 1952, the Jewish population of the
country more than doubled as a result of a massive immigration of 700,000 Jews. About
half of these immigrants were Westem (survivors of the Holocaust); the other half were
Eastem Jews. Immigration after 1952 continued, but at a slower pace. Yet, 55"Io of the
immigrants during the slow period were Eastern Jews. The ethnic division of the
immigrants changed dramatically in the 1990's with the massive immigration of Jews
from the former Soviet Union.
The persistent social and economic gaps between the two ethnic groups have been
the subject of extensive research (e.g.: Amir, 1987, Cohen and Haberfeld, 1998,
Haberfeld, 1992, Mark, 1994, Semyonov and Kraus, 1983, and Semyonov and Lerenthal,
1991). The main findings of these studies is that the gaps have not been closing over
time. Moreover, the (education and eaming) gaps between second-generation immigrants
are not smaller than these found among first-generation immigrants. The earning gaps are
attributed, in these studies, mainly to schooling gaps, and not to discrimination in the
labor market. Looking at some descriptive statistics of second-generation Jewish
immigrants in Israel (see Cohen and Haberfeld, 1998), one can find that in 1992, for
instance, the percentage of inen of Western origin with a college degree (or more) was
41.4"~o while for men of Eastern origin was 1 I.lo~o (the percentages for women were very
'o This me[hod was criticized by Heckman (1998), whoclaimed "Ihe audit method can fmd discrimination
when in fact none exists; it can also disguise discrimination when it is present."
9similar). The mean annual eaming of inen of Eastern origin that year was only 67.7
percent ofthat ofinen ofWestem origin (among women, the gap was about 200~0).
3. Experimental procedure
The participants in this experiment were 966 undergraduate Israeli students. One
group of players consisted of students from the University of Haifa and the Academic
College of Tel Aviv. All participants came from large (at least 70 students in class)
mandatory courses. Using name lists, we chose students from economic cowses in these
universities with typical ethnic names:" 122 names of Westem males, 135 names of
Eastem males, 118 names of Westetn women, and 108 names of Eastem women (483 in
total). These students played the role of Player B. The second group of players were
undergraduate students from Tel Aviv University. These students, recruited in their
classes, played the role of Player A. To enswe against biases, the matching between
students was done randomly, such that in any class of students the participants were from
all fow groups (westem males, eastem males, westem females, and eastem females).
Furthermore, all sessions were conducted by [he same experimenter.
The instructions are presented in Appendix 1. The students who played as Player
A were told that the experiment was being constructed in pairs and that they had already
been matched with another student from another university. The name ofthe person with
whom they were matched was written (in ink) at the bottom of the sheet of paper they
received.
" Many of the family names in Israel provide a good signal fot ethnic affiliation, a fact well recognized by
most of[he population.
]0Player A was then told that (s)he would receive 1`iIS 20" and that hisl}ter partner
(Player B) would not receive any amount. Player A was asked to decide if (s)he wanted to
transfer any amotmt ofthe NIS 20 to Player B, and ifso how much. The players were told
that the amount transfeaed would automatically be tripled and that the Player B with
whom they were matched would be informed in few days about all the details of the
game, including the amount that Player A transferred to him~her. Player B was then asked
to decide whether (s)he wanted to send any amount of the money (s)he received (three
times the sum allocated by Player A) back to Player A. This amount would not be tripled.
The students were told that this last transfer ended the experiment, and that we
would come to their classes one week later to pay them. The Player A students were then
asked to write their names and the amount they wanted to send to Player B. In the second
stage of the experiment, the students from the University of Haifa and the Academic
College of Tel Aviv were approached in their classes and told that we used the list of
names of the course participants, and that only some of the students were needed for the
experiment (though they were not told of the rule according to which the names were
chosen). The names were then called aloud, and the forms handed to the respective
students. The students in the role of Player B were given exactly the same description of
the experiment. They were also told the names of Player A with whom they were
matched, and the amount (s)he had decided to send them. After deciding on the amount
they wish to give back, they were paid privately and in cash.
" At the time of the experiment, á1-DIIS 3.6.
11After making hislher choice, each participant was asked to fill out a questionnaire.
The questions we were most interested in were the participant's gender and the birth place
ofhislher parents. This type ofquestions is not unusual in formal forms in Israel.




IM WM EM IF WF EF Sum
WM 31 23 15 23 16 14 122
EM 27 28 18 28 17 17 135
WF 22 22 21 23 14 ]6 118
EF 27 14 18 21 15 13 108
Total 107 87 72 95 62 60 483 ~
Table 1: Pairs of participants according to gender and ethnicity. WM refers to Westem
males, EF Eastem males, WF Westem females, and EF Eastern females. IM and
IF are "Israeli" males and females.
Note that in our procedure, each participant knows the name of the person with
whom (s)he is matched and that the decisions of participants were revealed to the
experimenter at the end of the experiment. This procedure is in contrast to Berg et al.
(1995), who used a double anonymity procedure to ensure that no one apart from the
" We put all the students we were unable to classify as Western or Eas[ern in the group labeled "Israel"
(for example, students with parents from both groups).
12participant himselfllterself knows hislher decision. Comparing behavior under these two
procedures is interesting by itself (see, for example, Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996),
but beyond the scope of the current study; moreover, this issue is of less importance for
the comparisons made in the current study.
4. Se~mented Society
Our first task was to establish the casual observation that the Israeli society is
indeed segmented along ethnic lines, not only with respect to customs and culture but,
more importantly, also with respect to trust. In order to study this issue, we observed the
way students who were assigned as Player A played the trust game with partners of
different ethnic backgrounds. In this part of the discussion, we consider only male
opponents. As will become evident later, trust depends on gender as well as on ethnic
affiliation.
The two competing hypotheses we test aze:
a) Israeli society is sufficiently integrated so that trust does not depend on the ethnic
affiliation of players; we expect that players of Eastern and Westem ethnic origin will
obtain similar money transfers.
b) Israeli society is segmented, and the money transfers in the trust game will depend on
ethnic affiliation.
Figure 1 describes the distribution of money transfers by Player A to Player B
according to the ethnic identity of Player B. The dark (respective light) columns describe
13the distribution of transfers when Player A was matched with someone with a typically
Eastern (respectively Westem) name. The difference between the two distributions is
striking. In particular, almost 60"Io of the students chose the efficient transfer (transfemng
the whole pie) when their opponen[ was of Westem origin, but only almost 200~o did so
when they faced an opponent of Eastern origin. Figure 1 tells us the whole (sad) story of
social segmentation within Israeli society.
Figure 1: Transfer to male players
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
t7TransfertoMalelWestem [iTransfertoMalelEastem
Observation 1: Israeli society is (strongly) segmented, reflected in part by the fact that
trust depends on ethnic stereotypes. In the game, money transferred to players with a
typical Western name was higher than the amounts transferred to students with typically
Eastem names. Specifically, the average amount transferred to a Westem male partner
tawas 15.15 whereas the average amount transfeaed to an Eastem male partner was 8.06
(or about 53"~0 of the average transfer to Westem male partners). A two-way analysis of
variance reveals that this difference is significant [F(1, 256)-61.64, P ~.00]."
Up to now we have examined the behavior ofthe general student population. Now
that we have established that trust may be affected by the ethnic afFiliation of the game
pariners, we will ttun to an examination of the pattem of tmst (or mistrust) between the
different groups in the Israeli society.
S. Gender and Discrimination
The pattem of trust and discrimination may depend not only on ethnic affiliation
but also on gender. There aze two separate but related questions when considering the
"gender effect." The first is: Are women ttvsted less, or more, than men, and does the
level of trust depends on their ethnic affiliation? The complementary question is: Do
women themselves discriminate between Westem and Eastem players the same way as
men do?
5.1 Trusting women:
For the first question, we study the trust game in which students who played the
role of Player A were matched with players B who had female names.
" In the text, we report the results of ffie ANOVA test. Although this is the standard anatysis, some of its
assumptions (such as the normality assumption) are problematic in our data. For that reason, we also report,
in the Appendix, the results of the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test based on rank. We wish to
emphasis that thc results ofthe two tests withour data was similar in all cases.
ISThe average transfer to female players in this experiment was 10.63, which is
similar to the average transfer to male players, 11.42, that was reported in the previous
section. This difference is insignificant [F(1, 478)-.1.58, P~.OS)J. Thus, an examination
of the transfers to players of a different gender did not reveal any pattem of
discrimination based on gender. This conclusion, however, may be misleading, as we
need to examine the genderlethnic combination.
Figure 2 describes the distribution of transfers to female players based on their
ethnic background. The average of transfers to female partners with typical Western
names is 11.02, while the average transfers to female partners with typical Eastern names
is 10.41. These two averages are similar, as is also evident from looking at Figure 2. The
difference is statistically insignificant [F(1,222)-.352, P~.OS)J.
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16Observation 2:
a) We found no evidence for ethnic discrimination between women.
b) The average transfer to women of Westem origin is 11.02, whereas that to men of
Westem origin is 15.15. Comparing the two distributions (see also Figures 1 and 2)
leads to the conclusion that women of Western origin are trusted less than men of
Westem origin. The difference is highly significant [F(1, 238~19.78, P~.00)]. On the
other hand, the average transfer to women of Eastern origin is 10.41 while the average
transfer to men ofEastern origin is 8.06. The conclusion derived from the distributions
of transfers is that women of Eastern origin are trusted more than men of Eastem
origin [P(1, 240)-5.57, P~.019)].
Trust may be an important factor in determining wages. It is, therefore, interesting
to observe that the ethnic eamings gaps in Israel among women are indeed smaller than
are those among men (see Cohen and Haberfeld, 1998); in recent years, in fact, Westem
men have increased the earnings gap between them and the three other groups (Westem
women, Eastem men, and Eastern women).
It is interesting to note that the above result is consistent with some of the early
studies on discrimination of black women in the USA. For example Epstein (1973)
pointed out that, although one may expect that being a black woman (double
subordination) may lead to a more severe discrimination, it may actually result in a
relative advantage.
175.2 Do women and men discriminate in the same way?
After discussing the behavior toward women, we now turn to a discussion of the
behaviorof women--that is, the way women play the trust game when they are assigned to
play Player A--and compare it to the way men play this game. In this part of the
discussion, we consider only the cases in which Player B was a male player. (Note that
the previous Section 5.1 did not find any evidence for discrimination between women of
different ethnic backgrounds.)
Figure 3a describes the money transfers by men (Player A) on the basis of the
ethnic affiliation of their opponents (Player B). This distribution of transfers was
contrasted with the transfers of female players, depicted in Figure 3b.
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Figure 3b: Transfer from female to MalelWestern
and MalelEastern
0 1 2 3 4 S 8 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
~To MalelWestern ~To MalslEastern
The comparison of Figure 3a (the money transfers by male players) with Figure
3b (the money transfers by female players) is striking: Men respond strongly to ethnic
stereotypes, whereas it seems that women disregard them.
19Specifically, the average amount that was given by women to male players of
Eastern background was 10.94, whereas the average amount transfened by women to
male players of Westem origin was 12.53. The difference between these numbers is
insignificant [F(I, 113)-1.48, P~.OS)]. By contrast, the average transfer made by male
players to male players ofEastern background was 5.62, whereas the average amount that
men transferred to male players of Westem origin was 17.16. That is, the average transfer
to male Western players was about three times that to male players of Eastern origin. The
difference between the numbers, furthermore, is significant [F(1, 140)-101.3, P~.00)].
Also, an examination of the outcomes of the game in which women played with other
women yields that the average transfer to Western women was 11.3 and the average
transfer to Eastem women was 10.38. Comparing these outcomes with the above results
indicates the absence of any significant difference in the amount of money that women
transferred with respect to gender.
Observatioo 3: (i) We found no evidence that women's trust in their game partners is
based on ethnic stereotypes or on gender.15
(ii) Men's trust in male players of Western origin is higher than women's trust in such
players. On the o[her hand, men's trust in male players of Eastem origin is lower than is
women's trust in such players.
's It was common knowledge in our experiment that all the players are students. It is possible that the
ethnical pattem of trust and mistrust also depends on the education level ofthe game partners. Thus our
experiments indicates that women do not discriminate according to ethnic background when they play with
educated partners. We, however, cannot extend such a behavior for the entire population of possible
partners.
206. Trust amoug segments: Systematic discrimination
The results presented in the previous sections do not necessazily imply the
existence of systematic discrimination against a particulaz ethnic group. Previous studies
have shown that even an arbitrary group affiliation may affect the way people treat
others.tó The group bias implies that people treat members of their own group more
favorably than they treat other people. Thus it is possible that the differences in trust
reported in Section 4 reflects a group bias. Players trust members of their own ethnic
gmup; if there were more students of Westem background in the population that we
studied, then the outcome that students of Westem origin received greater money
transfers is not stuprising.
In order to check for systematic mistrust or discrimination against one particulaz
ethnic group, we modified our experiment by taking into account the ethnic affiliation of
the students assigned to be Player A. This was done by asking them (after they had
played the game) to 611 out a short questionnaire in which one of the questions asked for
the cotintry ofbirth of their pazents." Given this information, we were able to distinguish
between the different ethniclgender groups of students who participated in the
experiment. Following otu observations in Section 5, we concentrate in this section on
studying the behavior of male players towazd male opponents. The population of male
students who took the role of Player A was divided into three groups according to the
16 See Tajfel (1982), Tajfel and Tumer (1979), Taylor and Moghaddam (1987), and Tumer, Brown, and
Tajfel (1979).
" Identifying ethnic affiliation is not viewed as an unusual information request in tnany forms that a typical
Israeli student has to fill out throughout his~her years ofstudy.












Figure 4a: Transfer to Male~Western by males
according to origin
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Figure 4b: Transfer to MalelEastern by males
according to origin
P ~r~l~, ~~~ ~ ~,~` , ~ ~:f
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 18 17 18 19 20
OFrom Malellsrael ~From MalelWestern ~From MalelEastern
22Figure 4a and 4b show that the pattem ofmistrust toward male players of Eastem
origin is common to all types of (male) players. The average transfer of malelEastem,
maleNVestem, and malelIsrael players to male~Western players was 17.4, 18.43, and
16.1, respectively. We found no statistically significant difference between these
transfers. The average transfer to malelEastem players was 5.28, 6.04, and 5.41,
respectively. Again, we found no statistically significant difierence between the transfers.
Observation 4: A systematic mistrust of inen of Eastem origin is found to be common
among men of different ethnic origins. In particular, this pattem of mistrust also
characterizes men of Eastem origin, who discriminate against members of their own
group.
We do not pmvide in the paper any explanation to this phenomena. It seems
however to us that, as part ofa cycle of prejudice and discrimination, and as a reaction to
their inferior status in the society, eastern jews come to believe in these stereotypes
themselves.
7. Is Discrimination Rational?
This last section discusses the possibility of having statistical discrimination in
our experiment. One possible explanation of the discrimination identified in our
experiment is that indeed peopie of different ethnic background respond difierently as
player B. In such a case ethnic discrimination may be rational and not a reflection of
23some "taste for discrimination" (for a discussion on this issue see Becker, 1957, and
Anow, 1973). To test for this, the reactíon of Players B(i.e., the amounts they
transfetred back to Player A) was examined to see if a consistent difference based on
ethnic affiliation characterized their response. Cleazly the decision by Player B on the
amount (s)he transfers to Player A depends on the amount that had been transfetred to
him~her in the first place. The averages of these amounts cannot be examined, as we
know already that players B of different ethnic origins received different amounts. This
comparison, then, may be done only with students who received the same amount from
Player A. There are enough observations to compare male students of different origins
who received IVIS 5, 10, 15, or 20.
Amount given
by Player A
Average sent back by
Western male
Average sent back by
Eastem male
5 10 15 20
1.8 13 17.2 24.3
2.8 14.2 16.7 23.1
Table 1: Average amount sent backby males according to ethnic background and the amount they received
from Player A. All differences reported in this table wi[h respect to the amount received by Player B are
insignificant at a.5 level of significance.
Observation 5: We found no evidence for statistical discrimination. That is, we found no
evidence that a malelEastetn player sent back an amount that differed significantly from
that retumed by a male~Westem player.
248. Coucludiu~ remarks
This paper identified one specific pattern of ethnic discrimination in Israeli
society: members of one ethnic group were trusted less than were members of another
ethnic group. It is important to emphasis that this conclusion was derived by examining
only one specific game experiment. In real life, of course, there aze many forms of trust.
Since our experiment captured only one form, we do not wish to extend our conclusions
beyond the scope of similaz sttategic situations.
An important distinction between the different forms ofdiscrimination is the level
of observability. Earnings and education, which have been the focus of most studies, are
variables for which data may be observable. An important aspect of discrimination deals,
however, with interpersonal relations which are much more difiicult to observe. Ifwe are
to devise public policies that aze aimed at correcting for discrimination, it would probably
be easier to implement such policies when the cases of discrimination aze observable.
When we consider trust and cooperation affected by ethnic affiliation, these forms of
discrimination are not observable. We can legislate that wages and school admission
should not be dependent on ethnic backgmund or gender, but how can we legislate trust?
It is important to note that the population that we studies consisted only of
students. The behavior of this group does not necessarily represents the entire Israeli
Jewish population. The fact, however, that there is such strong evidence of systematic
discrimination among university students, a group that is relatively educated and young,
indicates a segmented society, in which groups aze subject to discrimination.
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28Appendix A: Iostructions for Player A(translated from Hebrew)
Welcome to this experiment in decision-making. In this experiment, you may earn
some money that will be paid to you, privately and in cash, at the end.
The interaction in the experiment will be in pairs. You are called Student A and
the student you aze matched with is called Student B. The participants in the role of
student B aze from the University of Haifa.
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive NIS 20 and student B will not
receive any money. You are asked to decide whether you want to send any amount ofthis
NIS 20 to the student you aze matched with; and if so, how much. We will triple the
amount you send and give it to student B; that is, for every NIS 1 that you send, student B
will receive NIS 3.
In a few days from now, we will ask student B to decide if (s)he wants to send
back to you any amount of the money (s)he received (three times what you sent); and if
so, how much. This amount will not be tripled.
1'his will end the experiment, and the money will be paid.
Name of the student you are ma[ched with (Student B):
Your nazne:
Amount of money you want to send to student B: (Please remember that
this amount should be between NIS 0 and NIS 20.)
29Appendix B: Results of the Mauu-Whitney U-test based on ranks
As argued in the text, although ANOVA is the standard test in such studies, some
of the tests' assumptions, most notably the normality assumption, aze not fulfilled by our
data. To support the statistical analysis, therefore we also conducted a non-pazametric
test. As it tttrns out, the two tests result in similaz conclusions based on our data. The
results of the non-parametric test are given below in an order conesponding to the order
ofthe ANOVA test reported in the paper.
Comparison of Z P~
Transfer to Westem Males I Eastern Males 7.363 .000
Transfer to Males I Females 1.390 .164
Transfer to Western Females I Eastern Females .682 .527
Transfer to Western Males I Westem Females 4.672 .000
Transfer to Eastem Males I Eastern Females 2.073 .038
Transfer from Females to Westem Males I Eastern Males 1.288 .198
Transfer from Males to Western Males ~ Eastern Males 7.904 000
Table A 1: Results ofthe non-parametric test
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